Hello, the Informer here again. I decided to pull important portions of the Pollock Decision and put them here because I know more that 90 percent of you will not pull the entire case because it is so long. Maybe some of you will pull the case off the net as I did in Find law and read ALL of it. All jurisprudence in this country is derived from British law as I have stated many times and so has Montgomery as you will see in reading this case.

U.S. Supreme Court
POLLOCK v. FARMERS' LOAN & TRUST CO., 158 U.S. 601 (1895)
158 U.S. 601

Nos. 893 and 894.

May 20, 1895
It seems to us to inevitably follow that in Mr. Hamilton’s judgment at that time all internal taxes, except duties and [158 U.S. 601, 625] excises on articles of consumption, fell into the category of direct taxes.

Did he, in supporting the carriage tax bill, change his views in this respect? His argument in the Hylton Case in support of the law enables us to answer this question. It was not reported by Dallas, but was published in 1851 by his son, in the edition of all Hamilton’s writings except the Federalist. After saying that we shall seek in vain for any legal meaning of the respective terms ‘direct and indirect taxes,’ and after forcibly stating the impossibility of collecting the tax if it is to be considered as a direct tax, he says, doubtingly: ‘The following are presumed to be the only direct taxes: Capitation or poll taxes; taxes on lands and buildings; general assessments, whether on the whole property of individuals, or on their whole real or personal estate. All else must, of necessity, be considered as indirect taxes.’ “Duties,' ‘imposts,’ and ‘excises’ appear to be contradistinguished from ‘taxes.” ‘If the meaning of the word ‘excise’ is to be sought in the British statutes, it will be found to include the duty on carriages, which is there considered as an excise.’ ‘Where so important a distinction in the constitution is to be realized, it is fair to seek the meaning of terms in the statutory language of that country from which our jurisprudence is derived.’ 7 Hamilton’s Works, 848. Mr. Hamilton therefore clearly supported the law which Mr. Madison opposed, for the same reason that his friend Fisher Ames did, because it was an excise, and as such was specifically comprehended by the constitution. Any loose expressions in definition of the word ‘direct,’ so far as conflicting with his well-considered views in the Federalist, must be regarded as the liberty which the advocate usually thinks himself entitled to take with his subject. He gives, however, it appears to us, a definition which covers the question before us. A tax upon one’s whole income is a tax upon the annual receipts from his whole property, and as such falls within the same class as a tax upon that property, and is a direct tax, in the meaning of the constitution. And Mr. Hamilton, in his report on the public credit, in referring to contracts with citizens of a foreign country, said: ‘This principle, which seems critically correct, [158 U.S. 601, 626] would exempt as well the income as the capital of the property. It protects the use, as effectually as the thing. What, in fact, is property, but a fiction, without the beneficial use of it? In many cases, indeed, the income or annuity is the property itself.’ 3 Hamilton’s Works 34.

* * * * *

Being direct, and therefore to be laid by apportionment, is there any real difficulty in doing so? Cannot congress, if the necessity exist of raising thirty, forty, or any other number of million dollars for the support of the government, in addition to the revenue from duties, imposts, and excises, apportion the quota of each state upon the basis of the census, and thus advise it of the payment which must be made, and proceed to assess that amount of all the real and personal property and the income of all persons in the state, and collect the same, if the state does not in the meantime assume and pay its quota and collect the amount according to its own system, and in its own way? Cannot congress do this, as respects either or all these subjects of taxation, and deal with each in such manner as might be deemed expedient; as, indeed, was done in the act of July 14, 1798 (1 Stat. 597, c. 75)? Inconveniences might pos- [158 U.S. 601, 633] sibly attend the levy of an income tax, notwithstanding the listing of receipts, when adjusted, furnishes its own valuation; but that it is apportionable is hardly denied, although it is asserted that it would operate so unequally as to be undesirable.

* * * * *

Cooley (Tax’n, p. 3) says that the word ‘duty’ ordinarily ‘means an indirect tax, imposed on the importation, exportation, or consumption of goods’; having ‘a broader meaning than ‘custom,’ which is a duty imposed on imports or exports’; that ‘the term ‘impost’ also signifies any tax, tribute, or duty, but it is seldom applied to any but the indirect taxes. An ‘excise’ duty is an inland impost, levied upon articles of manufacture or sale, and also upon licenses to pursue certain trades or to deal in certain commodities.'

In the constitution, the words ‘duties, imposts, and excises’ are put in antithesis to direct taxes. Gouverneur Morris recognized this in his remarks in modifying his celebrated motion, as did Wilson in approving of the motion as modified. 5 Elliot, Db. 302. And Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution (section 952), expresses the view that it is not unreasonable to presume that the word ‘duties’ was used as equivalent to ‘customs’ or ‘imposts’ by the framers of the constitution, since in other clauses it was provided that ‘no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state,’ and that ‘no state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws’; and he refers to a letter of Mr. Madison to Mr. Cabell, of September 18, 1828, to that effect. 3 Madison’s Writings, 636.

* * * * *

In determining whether a tax on income from rents is a direct tax within the meaning of the constitution, the inquiry is not whether it may in some way indirectly affect the land or the landowner, but whether it is a direct tax on the thing [158 U.S. 601, 667] taxed, – the land. The circumstance that such a tax may possibly have the effect to diminish the value of the use of the land is neither decisive of the question, nor important. While a tax on the land itself, whether at a fixed rate applicable to all lands, without regard to their value, or by the acre, or according to their market value, might be deemed a direct tax, within the meaning of the constitution, as interpreted in the Hylton Case, a duty on rents is a duty on something distinct and entirely separate from, although issuing out of, the land.

* * * * *

But this is not all. The decision now made may provoke a contest in this country from which the American people would have been spared if the court had not overturned its former adjudications, and had adhered to the principles of taxation under which our government, following the repeated adjudications of this court, has always been administered. Thoughtful, conservative men have uniformly held that the government could not be safely administered except upon principles of right, justice, and equality, without discrimination against any part of the people because of their owning or not owning visible property, or because of their having or not having incomes from bonds and stocks. But, by its present construction of the constitution, the court, for the first time in all its history, declares that our government has been so framed that, in matters of taxation for its support and maintenance, those who have incomes derived from the renting of real estate, or from the leasing or using of tangible personal property, or who own invested personal property, bonds, stocks, and investments of whatever kind, have privileges that cannot be accorded to those having incomes derived from the labor of their hands, or the exercise of their skill, or the use of their brains. Let me illustrate this. In the large cities or financial centers of the country there are persons deriving enormous incomes from the renting of houses that have been erected, not to be occupied by the owner, but for the sole purpose of being rented. Near by are other persons, trusts, combinations, and corporations, possessing vast quantities of personal property, including bonds and [158 U.S. 601, 673] stocks of railroad, telegraph, mining, telephone, banking, coal, oil, gas, and sugar-refining corporations, from which millions upon millions of income are regularly derived. In the same neighborhood are others who own neither real estate, nor invested personal property, nor bonds, nor stocks of any kind, and whose entire income arises from the skill and industry displayed by them in particular callings, trades, or professions, or from the labor of their hands, or the use of their brains. And it is now the law, as this day declared, that under the constitution, however urgent may be the needs of the government, however sorely the administration in power may be pressed to meet the moneyed obligations of the nation, congress cannot tax the personal property of the country, nor the income arising either from real estate or from states, on the basis of their population, while it may compel the merchant, the artisan, the workman, the artist, the author, the lawyer, the physician, even the minister of the Gospel, no one of whom happens to own real estate, invested personal property, stocks, or bonds, to contribute directly from their respective earnings, gains, and profits, and under the rule of uniformity or equality, for the support of the government.

* * * * *


I will bold critical terms that you must understand. In doing so you can read back to see that what the court is saying is that any profession working for the government is subject to the income tax. While others of the same profession are not subject to the tax. That is why all the tax laws are for “special (occupational) taxes.” Those “occupational” taxes can only be “special” if applied to one who works for government, i.e. Dr. In VA Hospital, army, navy, or air force Dr., a cook in government employment, a lawyer in government employ, a mechanic, carpenter or electrician in government employ. These are all the “special” “(occupations)” that are taxed. Anyone else involved in those occupations is not in a “special” occupation and therefore not subject to tax. Now back to the case.

* * * * *

If congress should lay a tax of a given aggregate amount on incomes (above a named sum) from every taxable source, and apportion the same among the states on the basis of numbers, could any state be expected to assume and pay the sum assigned to it, and then proceed to reimburse itself by taxing all the property, real and personal, within its limits, thereby compelling those who have no taxable incomes to contribute from their means to pay taxes assessed upon those who have taxable incomes? Would any state use money belonging to all of its people for the purpose of discharging taxes due from or assessed against a part of them? Is it not manifest, that a national tax laid on incomes or on specific personal property, if apportioned among the states on the basis of population, might be ruinous to the people of those states in which the number having taxable incomes, or [158 U.S. 601, 679] who owned that particular kind of property, were relatively few when the entire population of the state is taken into account? So diversified are the industries of the states composing the Union that, if the government should select particular subjects or products for taxation, and apportion the sum to be raised among the states, according to their population, the amount paid by some of the states would be out of all proportion of the quantity or value of such products within their respective limits.

* * * * *

So, also, whenever this court has been called upon to give a construction to this clause of the constitution, it has universally held the words ‘direct taxes’ applied only to capitation taxes and taxes upon land. In the five cases most directly in point it was held that the following taxes were not direct, but rather in the nature of duty or excise, viz.: A tax upon carriages (Hylton v. U.S., 3 Dall. 171); a tax upon the business of insurance companies (Insurance Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433); a tax of 10 per cent. upon the notes of state banks held by national banks (Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533); a tax upon the devolution of real estate (Scholey v. Rew, 23 Wall. 331); and, finally, a general income tax was broadly upheld in Springer v. U.S., 102 U.S. 586. These cases, consistent and undeviating as they are, and extending over nearly a century of our national life, seem to me to establish a canon of interpretation which it is now too late to overthrow, or even to question. If there be any weight at all to be given to the doctrine of stare decisis, it surely ought to apply to a theory of constitutional construction, which has received the deliberate sanction of this court in five cases, and upon the faith of which congress has enacted two income taxes at times when, in its judgment, extraordinary sources of revenue were necessary to be made available.


The last paragraph listed Springer. I believe that if someone out there pulls the Springer case PLEADINGS, you will find Springer to be a government Employee and that is why this case is so published and used against us. The ruling would be correct because the 1862 Income Tax only affected Government employees, cotton, alcohol, and tobacco products. If Springer was not a government employee then he was involved in a taxable activity as mentioned in the Pollock case above. That is why I bolded those words so you could see what the Court was talking about. There are taxable and non-taxable incomes according to the Court. The carriage tax was in Washington D.C. and Congress could tax whenever they wanted because Washington was their domain. Not only that, but, it to passed constitutional muster because the carriage tax was the beginning of today’s tax on passenger cars. The tax was laid on carriages that carried “PASSENGERS” for HIRE. That is why the cars of today are called “Passenger” cars because if they do not carry “passengers” and only “guests” that are not taxable, do not have to be registered and you do not need a license. See, this goes all the way back to the horse and buggy days. These “carriages” became known as “vehicles.” And horse drawn “vehicles had to have a driver that had a license. You can research this as I did in the 1890, era before automobiles were invented and you will see that a rider on a horse need not have a license. But should that rider hook up the horse to a “vehicle,” he was required to have a license, IF he was carrying “passengers” for hire or articles of another in order to make money. Just look at an airline ticket on the back and what do you see? Carriage? Passenger? Do you see the word “guest”? No and you will not find the word “guest” in any Motor vehicle laws, only “passenger.” Now look up “guest” and “passenger” in any law dictionary, Black’s, Ballentine’s or Brown and Littles if you are fortunate to have Brown’s.

In fact New Jersey Motor Vehicle Statute lays it out very nicely that “such self-propelling vehicles as used NEITHER for the conveyance of persons for HIRE, PLEASURE or BUSINESS, * * * are excepted from the provisions of this chapter.” N.J.S.A. 39:3-1

And in North Carolina the statute is not as specific as New Jersey’s but can be found in the following sections;

20-4.01. Definitions. Unless the context requires otherwise, the following definitions apply throughout this Chapter to the defined words and phrases and their cognates:

(20) Manufacturer’s Certificate. – A certification on a form approved by the Division, signed by the manufacturer, indicating the name of the person or dealer to whom the therein-described vehicle is transferred, the date of transfer and that such vehicle is the first transfer of such vehicle in ordinary trade and commerce. The description of the vehicle shall include the make, model, year, type of body, identification number or numbers, and such other information as the Division may require.

Real crafty here because you DO NOT have to turn over the C of O if not involved in trade or commerce. Reading further;

(27) Passenger Vehicles. –
a. Excursion passenger vehicles. – Vehicles transporting persons on sight-seeing or travel tours.

b. For hire passenger vehicles. – Vehicles transporting persons for compensation. This classification shall not include vehicles operated as ambulances; vehicles operated by the owner where the costs of operation are shared by the passengers; vehicles operated pursuant to a ridesharing arrangement as defined in G.S. 136-44.21; vehicles transporting students for the public school system under contract with the State Board of Education or vehicles leased to the United States of America or any of its agencies on a nonprofit basis; or vehicles used for human service or volunteer transportation.

Excursion vehicles carry sight-seeing passengers for hire whether classed at private passenger or not. N.C.’s registration says “private passenger.” People think that “private” means it is not used for hire. Such is not the case when reading the above is it? Go back and look at the legal definition of “passenger” and “guests.”

(29a) Private Motor Carrier. – A person who transports passengers or property by motor vehicle in interstate commerce and is not a for-hire motor carrier.

This means you do not advertise or put a sign out like a taxi cab does, which is a “for hire carrier.”

(32a) Regular Drivers License. – A license to drive a commercial motor vehicle that is exempt from the commercial drivers license requirements or a noncommercial motor vehicle.

The presumption is that it is still carrying passengers for hire although not commercial. Weight has nothing to do with whether it is to be registered or you need a license.

§20-23.1. Suspending or revoking operating privilege of person not holding license.
In any case where the Division would be authorized to suspend or revoke the license of a person but such person does not hold a license, the Division is authorized to suspend or revoke the operating privilege of such a person in like manner as it could suspend or revoke his license if such person held a driver’s license, and the provisions of this Chapter governing suspensions, revocations, issuance of a license, and driving after license suspended or revoked, shall apply in the discretion of the Division in the same manner as if the license has been suspended or revoked. (1955, c. 1187, s. 19; 1969, c. 186, s. 2; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1979, c. 667, s. 41.)

Now you must see the article I posted on PERSON and now you get a better idea of what Pollock Court was talking about “driver license” is issued for the privilege of carrying “passengers” in your private “carriage” that the Court said Hylton needed and why it was taxed as an excise tax.

All the statutes that you read after those I quoted above do not apply to you. However you are lulled back into their system when reading all the other sections because of what you have been taught. This is not to say that if you cause a damage they cannot come after you. They can use the same laws as used on “drivers” provided the “DAMAGED” party files a complaint, otherwise the Officer cannot write you a summons unless he can show a damage to himself that you have caused. What, you say, has this got to do with income taxes? You haven’t read Pollock very closely and if you did, you have not the legal background to comprehend what the Pollock Court was saying and what the income tax laws say about “special (occupational) taxes”.

Till the next time.
The Informer